For an event seen as a disastrous consequence for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, and a supposed ‘red line’ for the Kremlin, the ascension of Finland into NATO ended up being something of a non-event. One could even say that it was simply a matter of Finland confirming its natural allyship with its counterparts in Europe and America. Yet just a few decades earlier Finland’s foreign policy was derided for turning Finland into a powerless shell that was beholden to its larger neighbour to the East. Colloquially known as ‘Finlandisation’, the policy of neutrality was settled upon in the aftermath and peace terms of the Winter War; a war started by the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland in 1940. Neutrality turned Finland into a grey zone between the West and the Soviet Union, one which rejected the bipolarity of the Cold War in order to resolve tensions with the Soviets.
Despite this, Finland has been largely underestimated in its ability to defend its own sovereignty. Even under the policy of neutrality, Finland always felt the need to protect itself against invasion, and built up its defensive capabilities accordingly. The Finnish has long used a system of compulsory military service to build up a massive army of reserves, meaning that whilst its active military was a relative minnow, the combat-ready forces it could call up forms one of the strongest militaries in Europe. Finland also keeps the largest artillery force in Europe, has the largest artillery practice range in Europe, and has its own domestic industry for armoured vehicles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave Finland the opportunities to broaden its horizons for military imports, and it now boasts a large force of modern Leopard tanks from Germany and has ordered a sizable number of new generation F-35 jets from the United States. Not only have these defensive proficiencies allowed Finland to brush off Russian threats of retaliation when deciding to join NATO, but they have also helped Finland appeal to NATO as a strong partner that can offer a significant amount to the alliance.
Finland’s long-held policy combination of compromise and strength, a balance between fear and trust, is a product of the nation’s short history. A part of the Russian Empire for over a century, Finland’s independence came about in uncharacteristic and surprising circumstances, with the Bolsheviks allowing them to break away from the Russian Empire soon after coming to power. Finland’s quick and bloodless independence was a moment of surprising harmony in the transition between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, as other minorities were met with repression and even violence from the Bolsheviks when they tried to declare their own independence. Peace would not last for long, however, as just a month after independence the country became embroiled in a civil war between its socialist faction, which was supported by the Bolsheviks, and the anti-socialist coalition of liberals and conservatives, which was supported by the German Empire. The war was won by the anti-socialist forces, but their reliance on Germany’s support cost Finland its freedom in the months after, with the Germans pressuring the Finnish government to set up a short-lived monarchy with a German king. This showed that despite winning its independence, Finland was still far from finding its identity as a sovereign nation.
A not dissimilar episode played out during the Second World War, when Finland was initially invaded by the Soviet Union under Stalin, who sought to revive the socialist faction in Finland and bring it under the Soviet Union’s control. The Finns fought a spirit defensive war, and ended up only ceding a small part of its territory. Unsettled with this, however, and angered by a Soviet bombing raid on Finnish cities, the Finnish government turned to Nazi Germany for support, allowing Nazi troops to be stationed in Finland to fight alongside the Finns as they sought to retake their territory; and reclaim the contested region of East Karelia. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union did not appreciate Finland’s decision to ally with the Nazis, and in the peace agreements following the war they made the Finns expel Nazi troops by force, imposed heavy sanctions and tried political leaders for collaboration.
Finland’s conflicts left the country deeply divided between nationalists who bemoaned Finland’s connection with the Soviet Union, and those on the left aligned with the Soviet Union, who deplored the nationalists’ involvement with Germany. Finland in the inter-war period had reached a consensus on liberal democracy and a free market economy after reforms had built Finland from the ruins of the Civil War, but geopolitically, Finland found itself stuck in a grey zone between the East and the West, with inherent suspicion of external influence from both sides. Neutrality was therefore a compromise which helped unite Finnish society, keeping it separate from either alliance.
As part of this, Finland settled on a policy of trusting both sides enough to maintain friendly relations, but still seeing both sides as a threat to national security. For its actions in the Second World War, Finland was largely at the mercy of the Soviet Union, and had to accept unfavourable peace terms in order to maintain its sovereignty and avoid being sucked into the Warsaw Pact. Even so, Finland’s determination to find ways around the Soviet imposed limits on the size of its armed forces showed that the Finns did not trust the Soviet Union as an ally. At the same time, Finland agreed to the key Soviet clause that Finland would resist any attempt at foreign invasion and request aid from the Soviet Union in such an event, reflecting Finland’s historical experience of being used as a pawn in East-West conflict. This was directly aimed at Germany after the war, but also indirectly implicated the U.S., and ensured that Finland would not be used as a front for a NATO invasion of the Soviet Union.
It would be wrong, however, to interpret Finnish foreign policy in this period as being driven by paranoia of outside powers and their interests. In fact, Finland developed an active foreign policy during the Cold War under the leadership of Urho Kekkonen, which was aimed to ease tensions and lead a move towards Detente in Europe. As part of this, Finland proposed a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone and set up the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a security initiative between 35 nations from Europe and North America aimed at reducing tensions in Central Europe. The conference culminated in the Helsinki Accords in 1975, in which all member states agreed to respect territorial integrity, adhere to human rights laws, and increase economic cooperation across the borders between East and West. Ahti Karjalainen, Finland’s foreign minister at the time, described the warming of relations encouraged by the Conference as the “Spirit of Helsinki.”
Critics of its foreign policy have argued that Finland was only able to maintain its neutrality because of the influence coming from the U.S. and its allies from the West; which discouraged the Soviet Union from exerting too much influence over its much smaller neighbour. The Soviets, however, had no concerns when it came to pushing for a closer military alliance with Finland during the Cold War, as shown by the Note Crisis in 1961. What kept Finland independent from Soviet foreign policy was its active approach towards cooperation and Detente, which allowed Finland to maintain friendly and productive relations with both sides without hindering its relationship with one or the other. Finland managed to largely retain its domestic independence through its foreign policy, remaining a free, democratic state despite being closely tied to the Soviet Union, and the importance of its own political will cannot be overlooked in understanding why this was so. This success has to be considered as partially due to the diplomatic nouse and direction of Finland’s political leaders, especially when considering the fate of other countries in the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence.
Of course, neutrality did not make Finland a powerhouse that was able to stand up to the Soviet Union at its own will. Efforts to cosy up to the Soviet Union, especially by censoring anti-Soviet media, can only be described as appeasement, and have blemished Finland’s democratic history. Such policies, however, must be viewed in the wider context of Finland’s history. Unlike other nationalities of the Russian Empire, Finland had secured its independence through diplomacy, but less than fifty years later it watched in fear as one by one Eastern European states were reconquered in the Soviet Union’s unstoppable march West. Finland could have easily expected a similar fate, having been invaded by the Soviets just a few years earlier and having cooperated with the Nazis. To avoid this, the Finns turned back to their diplomatic relationship, looking to prove that a free Finland was of more use to the Soviets than a conquered Finland. As future President Urho Kekkonen put it at the time in 1944, “the Soviet Union must stand to gain a bigger advantage from an independent Finland clinging to life than from a broken Finland doomed to a dependent existence.” It was the diplomatic approach taken by the Finns after the war, as well as a realistic view that they could not completely leave the Soviet’s sphere of influence, that avoided them becoming the next victim of Stalin’s victory.
Finland’s active foreign policy neutrality during the Cold War built it out as a power with its own standing on the world stage, a fate radically different from the rest of the Soviet Union’s border nations. Finland’s ambition was driven by its desire to move Europe away from the brink as Cold War tensions peaked in the early 1960s. As a result, Finland was able to exercise some control over its own destiny, typifying the spirit of Detente between both sides and helping to heal the divisions in Europe created by the Cold War schism.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 only strengthened Finland’s sovereign will. The weakening of Russia’s power allowed Finland to explore closer military ties with the West without feeling as though it was looking over its shoulder, joining NATO’s partnership for peace program in 1994 and buying more of its military equipment from Western states. Finland also joined the European Union in 1995, pursuing what it saw as its European identity. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Finland to leave the door open for NATO membership if it felt it was under threat, which essentially reversed its Cold War policy of turning to the Soviet Union to protect against invasion from the West. The confidence of Finland to align itself towards the West so quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, whilst also promoting strong economic relations with Russia, only further demonstrates how Finland’s foreign policy strategy emboldened it to pursue its own national destiny without becoming overly subservient to one side.
The major question for Finland’s foreign policy now is simply: where next? Finland has gained a great deal from its entry into NATO, but this was an emergency lever which for a long time Finland had hoped it never needed to pull. Now that Russia has shown the full extent of its hostility towards the West, Finland must confront itself with the reality of Russian aggression potentially coming to its borders, a reality the Baltic States have been living with for over a decade. The war in Ukraine will undoubtedly encourage a lot more confidence in the capabilities of the Finnish army, but with the stakes raised between NATO and Russia, Finland could need to turn to its allies for immediate protection.
After joining NATO, the next consideration for Finland is whether it wants to station NATO troops on its territory. Finland has already begun negotiations with the U.S. under a Defence Cooperation Agreement which would see the U.S. deploy troops in Finland. Alongside this, Finland also hosted NATO land and air exercises, and held joint training exercises with U.S. marines in a three month posting to the country. All of these things suggest Finland’s readiness to act as a leader in the defence of NATO’s borders, but this simultaneously requires NATO’s active participation to ensure Finland’s territorial integrity. As well as this, hosting NATO troops would drag Finland into wider East-West hostilities, particularly in the Arctic Theatre. The Arctic Theatre is a front which Russia has long been paranoid about, seeing it as a potential vulnerability in its national defence. As a result, Russia has made a point of keeping its largest naval fleet in the Arctic. Although Finland doesn’t border the sea to the north, the expansion of NATO’s land and air operations in this area could increase hostility and mistrust through military manoeuvres and exercises, potentially making Finland a hot-point of tensions.
Given the geopolitical climate that has emerged from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland is vindicated in its decision to stop placating Russia. Finland is not only vindicated in joining NATO for the sake of morality or the need for protection, but also because the West has proven itself to be a responsible actor with a basic level of respect for Finland’s sovereignty, ending any debate about Finland’s position between the Eastern and Western spheres. With this being said, however, Finland would be well-minded not to abandon all of the lessons it has learned in the past. Neutrality may no longer be possible, but that doesn’t make Finland’s ability to ensure its own national security and to act independently on the global stage any less feasible or desirable.
Finland’s strength during the Cold War, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union, was derived from its ability to defend itself from invasion, building up its large force of skilled reserves and domestic defence manufacturing capabilities. Particularly in this day and age, Finland cannot afford to underestimate the importance of maintaining its independence in the area of national defence if it wants to have its own agency in global affairs. Becoming overly-reliant on the West for defence could threaten Finland’s status as a geopolitical power, leading to it being seen as more of a geopolitical pawn in the eyes of the West; and in turn encouraging Russia to use more provocative tactics. Furthermore, Finland would be wise to maintain a healthy apprehension about its Western allies, not because they pose an external threat, but because their long-term trustworthiness cannot be assured. This is particularly true in the case of the U.S., which continues to struggle with the isolationist politics of Trump and the populist right, and also sees China and the Pacific theatre as its main focus.
All in all, Finland currently finds itself in a state of transition, and the question of what Finland’s global purpose should be after the end of its long held neutrality policy is now one which must be answered quickly. Finland’s ability to act as a mediator between both sides may have been lost, but the things that made it powerful enough to do so have not. Finland’s value to NATO as one of its most combat-ready and capable fighting forces, and its importance towards Russia as a powerful neighbour on its Western border, gives Finland the power to conduct its own foreign policy, one which can help make its uncomfortable position on the map a bit more comfortable. Of course, it can not be simply assumed that Finland will become weakened by its integration with the West, and Finland has already signalled its intent to maintain its own sovereign power with the largest increase in defence spending in the world. History, however, should be a reminder that the state of the nation is defined by the strength of its foreign policy, and that Finland only loses out when it becomes a pawn of wider regional tensions. In the words of former Finnish President Mauno Koivisto: “if something must be wrong in the country be it domestic policy, not foreign policy.” Finland must therefore take a balanced path forward, maintaining its autonomy over its foreign policy whilst also pursuing a close and productive relationship with the West, for the sake of both its security and its influence.
Cover Photo Credit: NATO Multimedia
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