Non-academic research paper, published 29th December 2023
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union came to Central Asia in a flash. Whilst other Soviet states were agitators of its downfall, with determined nationalist movements overwhelming the hapless Soviet authorities, the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan watched on as the world they had grown used to crumbled around them. After the collapse, power was generally retained by the old Soviet elite, who carefully stage-managed the transition to independent statehood. They constructed nationalist political movements, created a ‘democratic’ party system which in reality was dominated by the ruling parties, and implemented market economies which were dominated by systems of corruption and nepotism. These changes have been orchestrated by so-called presidents who have become untouchable through their use of subversion, intimidation and repression, with power being passed down the line in a neo-dynastical fashion. The creation of parliaments and the independent media outlets have largely been a facade – and the Central Asia known to the outside world today is one of modern personality cults, with statues and vanity projects in empty cities masking the reality of ordinary life. In this surrealist image, it may seem as though life hasn’t really changed since Soviet times. Egotistical dictators try to live in the remnants of the Soviet past, whilst for ordinary people; life simply passes by.
Behind this facade, however, the collapse of Soviet rule in Central Asia has created a more dynamic and unstable environment in the region than ever before, where ordinary people participate in political life in unprecedented ways. This has included political uprisings like the recent ‘Bloody January’ in Kazakhstan, civil war in Tajikistan, violent standoffs between protesters and authorities such as the massacres seen in Zhanaozen and Andijan, as well as other ethnic clashes and riots. These uprisings and hostilities may be few and far between, but when they have happened, they have often been explosive flashpoints which have quickly descended into chaos, threatening the authority of the state. Such incidents have pierced through the thin veneer of order and stability created by the old elite, showing just how temporary and vulnerable these governments are as placeholders in a post-independence vacuum, and raising the uncertain nature of Central Asia’s future.
Analysis of the Historiography
Typically, such incidents of unrest and violence have been studied in relation to the end of Soviet rule, where the uprooting of the status quo resulted in ethnic violence and Islamic extremism. This is most obvious in the case of Tajikistan, where a bloody Civil War started when competing regional factions tried to seize power from the weak and unpopular Communist government. This was widely seen as a battle for political legitimacy post-independence, with the transition to independence providing the opportunity for different regional leaders to claim power over the country. It is also a suggestion of the propensity for violence between different ethnic groups living in states which had been arbitrarily drawn together by the Soviets, but were deeply divided on regional lines. Similarly, the rise of extremist Islamist movements in the 1990s, a product of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent influence the Taliban had in the region, is often cited as another example of how political authority was challenged in the newly independent states, and how the future of the Central Asia was hardly certain at the time.
In more recent times, historians have challenged the broad assumption that unrest and violence were merely the result of a power vacuum left by the Soviet Union’s dissolution, arguing instead that underlying economic problems were the main cause. Historian Isaac Scarborough provided a different interpretation of the causes of the Tajik Civil War, arguing that Gorbachev’s economic reforms created the conditions for violence by causing a fall in living standards and a rise in unemployment. This created an atmosphere of discontent, particularly amongst young men who were disproportionately affected by the high unemployment, who were exploited by regional leaders who funded those willing to pick up arms for their different factions. In another example, historians Gulnara Dadabayeva and Dina Sharipova compared two bouts of civil unrest that occurred in the oil town of Zhanaozen in 1986, and from 2009 on and off until present day. They argued that civil unrest was caused by a rise in ‘economic nationalism’, in which local workers responded to a failure to protect their economic interests. In 1986, this manifested in ethnic violence towards seasonal workers brought in from the Caucasus, who were targeted because they were paid higher wages by the Soviet administration and had better living conditions than local workers. In the past decade or so, this anger has been directed at the international companies who now control the oil production in the region after the economic liberalisation of the 1990s. Workers complained about being constantly laid off due to temporary sub-contracting, as well as being paid much less than managers and better-trained foreign workers.
What this shows is that people in Central Asia did not simply resort towards ethnic and regional violence when the opportunity presented itself; in some brutish and barbaric manner, but that there were fundamental socio-economic problems which motivated people’s behaviours. More importantly, what these historical interpretations show is that Central Asia can not be studied by periodising Central Asian history into contrasting eras of Soviet and independent rule, but that there are continuities that existed across both periods. Furthermore, this new approach to studying Central Asia finds that its society is more vibrant and dynamic than is commonly perceived, with people interacting with the state in complex ways. For too long, Central Asians have been viewed as lacking a collective political consciousness, unable to engage with the state in meaningful ways and instead acting out of mindless opportunism around the margins of authoritarian rule. Essentially, Central Asians have been dismissed as politically backwards, especially by Western and Soviet scholars who judged them by their own political norms, which has wrongly led to the conclusion that ordinary people have been passive bystanders in their own history.
Hypothesis
Countering this flawed narrative, this paper will seek to analyse recent events that have rocked the Central Asian region in order to prove that ordinary people actively participate in a dynamic and quickly evolving political environment. In order to understand the tectonic changes that are happening in Central Asian society, where interactions between the state and society are more volatile and fluid than ever before, the continuities of Central Asia throughout its history need to first be understood to show how centuries-held norms and systems are breaking apart to create a new era of instability. As well as this, a compelling argument must be made that ordinary people in Central Asia have always participated in political life, and that the difference in their behaviours compared to political norms in other societies does not suggest some inherent backwardness, but is rather indicative of the unique way in which Central Asian society has evolved. This paper broadly agrees with the economic arguments which explain the rise of discontent in the late and post-Soviet era, but expands upon this narrative by looking at how centuries’ worth of traditions and norms are being challenged by a changing economic environment, which is leading to increasingly volatile and unpredictable political currents.
This paper is centred around the idea of a homogeneous ‘Central Asian society’, a concept which requires definition as of course, the historical experiences of different parts of Central Asia were different to one another. ‘Central Asian society’ is characterised by a uniform pattern that developed that has led to repeated norms and activities amongst the Turkic peoples that populate the region. These norms and activities have developed in unique conditions compared to other parts of the world, and the success of Central Asians in insulating their culture from outside forces has meant that much of it has remained a presence in everyday life despite all of the change happening in and around it.
Central Asia in the Age of Empires
The lands of the five Central Asian states, situated between the Caspian Sea to the West and the Gobi Desert to the East, are made up of vast, barren steppes which experience very little precipitation. This hostile terrain has created a long history of shepherding and horse breeding amongst the Turkic peoples who inhabit Central Asia. Historically, they formed nomadic tribes which moved between higher and lower ground between the seasons. Where there was water, flowing through raucous rivers in mountains and ravines, sedentary communities formed around agriculture. This created a pattern of settlements surrounded by scattered nomadic tribes, a pattern which was sewn together by frequent trade and cultural exchange. Spread across a wide geographic area and with little in the way of fixed boundaries, the Turkic inhabitants came to form dozens of different ethnic groups and languages, interconnected by cultural and linguistic similarities, but distinctly separate from one another.
Such an incohesive societal structure, which had very little in the way of institutions or identities to hold it together, made the region very pervious to outside influences. Rather than defining its identity in opposition to these influences, society in Central Asia evolved by adapting to the changes brought by the rest of the world. The expansion of the Abbasid Empire and the spread of Islam in the 8th century had a profound impact on the region, with Central Asians adopting Islamic faith and blending it with their own cultures, creating offshoots of folk Islam. Political institutions throughout Central Asian history have often been headed by outside powers, with the Mongol and Russian (then Soviet) Empires ruling over Central Asia for long periods of its history, whilst in other periods the sporadic tribes were led by Khanate dynasties; which were formed on the basis of religious authority. At no point in Central Asian history was the concept of ‘nationhood’ part of the region’s vocabulary, a fact which would come full circle after independence.
Although these political structures had total political power, ordinary people often protected their own unique ways of living by maintaining a long held tradition of keeping the state separate from society. This tradition, established during the periods of Persian and Mongol rule, learned to evolve to the oppressive rule of war-hungry empires by preserving local patterns of living in communities across Central Asia. As such, much of the administration of Central Asian society was not centralised, but decided within localities. In nomadic communities, this was almost a second nature, as communities were dispersed over wide areas and there was very little in the way of written word, with law and customs being practised through spoken word. Sedentary communities were, in theory, much easier to centrally control, but in Central Asia long-standing laws and traditions preserved systems of local administration. Unlike other Medieval societies, rulers did not enjoy total ownership of land, with local elites having intermediary rights to property ownership. As religion remained the supreme authority, Islamic law was practised by local courts, with the chief judge often being the head of a settlement. For foreign powers such as the Mongol Empire; and later in history the Russian Empire, having such comfortable arrangements in the lands they occupied was desirable, as it meant that there was less resistance to suppress, and also meant that they didn’t have to spend resources on administering society themselves. As a result, they often allowed Central Asian communities to practise their own autonomy, rather than brutally oppressing the people they came to rule over. This did not mean that there was no resistance to occupation in Central Asia, but on the whole Central Asia had a fundamentally different experience of imperialism compared to other parts of the world – as it sought to compromise and preserve local ways of life through passive means.
Central Asian history is therefore defined by factors that were radically different to those of the rest of the world. Politically, society evolved through coexistence, cultural mixing and trade, whilst the rest of the world evolved through war and conflict. The main reason for this passivity in the face of oppression was the lack of a common identity which united people. Other than religion, there was little that brought a sense of commonality amongst the various different tribes and ethnic groups that inhabited the steppes. In the absence of an ideology or identity for people to distinguish themselves by, the blending of different societies became the norm. Such passivity can easily be interpreted as compliance, but in reality people interacted in dynamic and vibrant ways with their political surroundings, shaping the empires that came to rule over them as much as they were shaped by them.
Coexistence continued so long as people lived in rural, interspersed communities, more interested in their traditional ways of life rather than political ideals. In a history of continuity, life in Central Asia began to be uprooted during the period of Soviet rule from the early 20th century onwards. First of all, the Soviets, in line with their belief in international socialism, organised the Central Asian peoples into five nationalities – the nationalities that exist today. This was done by drawing arbitrary borders between the ethnic groups of the region, a somewhat flawed experiment which has led to ethnic tensions and disputes over territories. Secondly, the Soviet period brought about a rapid industrialisation, making use of untapped industries in the region and bringing about new industries as well. The process of industrialisation brought about a huge movement of people from rural to urban life, with cities growing massively in size and new industrial towns being created.
The local patterns of Central Asian society presented a challenge to the Soviets as it made the spreading of ideology much harder, especially as people weren’t mobilised into an economy instituted by the state. The break up of these traditional patterns of living has slowly brought people together under new identities that have transformed politics in the region. It is these identities: class and nationality, that have uprooted centuries of norms and traditions; and have created an entirely uncertain future for the region.
Zhanaozen case study
The emergence of class and nationality-based identities is forging a revolutionary transformation of Central Asian society, changing people’s political interactions with the state by causing them to find commonality with one-another through their socioeconomic situation and their citizenship. This has led people to engage in politics on dividing lines, fighting for the interests of their own ‘group’ against the interests of other groups. In the case of Zhanaozen, these political changes can be seen taking shape in the town’s tumultuous history. Zhanaozen was founded as an oil town in the 1960s. Exploiting the huge reserves of the nearby oilfield in Uzen, the town became populated by Kazakh workers and seasonal migrants. Divisions formed between the two groups as it became clear that migrants received preferential treatment, leading to class tensions and a national fervour amongst the Kazakh workers, who felt as though they were being treated as second class citizens on their own soil. The combination of civic and economic divisions led to a spate of chaotic violence, which historians Dadabayeva and Sharipova defined by the term ‘economic nationalism’.
Class division and nationalism continue to fuel the flames in Zhanaozen today, but now these grievances come from a different place. After the fall of the Soviet Union, oil production came under the private ownership of Western companies. There was an initial promise of higher wages and better health and safety standards, but this promise was soon overtaken by malpractice; as a culture of subcontracting developed. Subcontracts were given out to companies with lower standards, and with contracts constantly changing hands, workers are hired and laid off on a routine basis. Due to the many different subcontractors, workers of the same nationality are now being paid different wages for doing the same job, sometimes in the same refinery. Feeling the brunt of these injustices, the people of Zhanaozen have refused to give up the fight. Their struggle started in 2011, when a strike was put down with brutal force by the police, killing dozens. Justice took on another dimension after this incident, as the town’s inhabitants have continued their protest every year since the massacre. It was their ever-burning determination that sparked a wildfire in January 2022 – spreading across the oil-producing towns along the Caspian Sea and eventually across the country – a popular uprising unlike any other seen in Central Asian history before.
The uprising, initially a rally against rapidly inflating fuel prices, quickly turned against the legacy of the former Prime Minister Nazarbayev, who had become more of a dictator over his thirty year rule. The protestors pulled down statues of Nazarbayev and chanted against his name, and eventually a disorganised attempt was made to topple the government. The ‘January Uprising’ as it is now known expressed a rise in nationalist sentiment and a deep discontent at Kazakhstan’s exploitation by its more powerful neighbours.
The presence of Russia and China is still felt heavily through their economic interests in the country, especially in its natural resources. China has a majority stake in Kazakhstan’s largest oil company, while Russia remains crucial for the transporting of oil to other countries. Whilst both countries are also behind a lot of investment in Kazakhstan’s economy, they take a lot out in exports. Protests against growing Chinese influence have been gathering pace for a number of years, and a deep-seated mistrust of Russians provoked by the fear of Russia invading Kazakhstan to protect the Russian minority have given people reason to turn towards a reactionary nationalist movement. This sentiment came to a head in the January Uprising, which was sparked by what was seen as a tax on domestic consumers having to pay the price for the country’s reliance on oil exports to Russia and China. In the oil towns like Zhanaozen, frustration at foreign influence has borne out of the fact that international companies take out healthy profits whilst living standards for ordinary people have failed to rise. For many, it seems that foreign actors are now at odds with the people.
The rise of a national identity in Central Asia has led to a popular antagonism towards other nations, but is inherently linked with class divisions. The new working class sees its oppressors as not only the rich but the international, whether it be the economic migrants of the Soviet era or the multinational corporations of the post-Soviet era of globalisation. This has caused Central Asians to become increasingly hostile towards the outside world, and deeply suspicious of their own governments’ role in facilitating their exploitation. The governments of Central Asia turned towards national identity after independence as a means of holding historically disparate populations together in newly independent states, but they have always been careful to promote Central Asian nationalism as open and tolerant, a continuation of their past coexistence with the surrounding world. The phenomenon they have sought to promote, however, has now become their biggest threat, as an increasingly mistrustful and protectionist form of nationalism calls into question an arrangement which is seen to advance foreign interests at the expense of ordinary people.
This section exemplifies how Central Asian society has been fundamentally and irreversibly affected by the processes of industrialisation and globalisation, processes which have completely altered the way in which ordinary people view their lives. No longer able to establish a balanced relationship with outside influences, Central Asians are now becoming controlled by them, and this domination has made it necessary for people to organise in ways they have never before. People are now becoming used to defining themselves based on the characteristics of their own ‘crowd’; and are mistrustful of those who don’t fit into it. This is the way in which political conflict has been created throughout history, but in Central Asia, for so long voluntarily trapped in its own time bubble, it is uprooting everything that came before it, sowing a field of radical and revolutionary ideas. Such effects are still yet to be felt across the whole region, with many in rural areas still living in continuity with their past, but in industrial towns such as Zhanaozen, a political revolution is underway, and there is little that can be done to stop it.
Tajikistan Case Study
The Civil War in Tajikistan was truly unique as the only example of a state, not only in Central Asia, but anywhere in the former Soviet Union failing to transition successfully to independence and succumbing to a bloody battle for power. After the dissolution of the USSR, the fading legitimacy of an increasingly unpopular communist government left a power vacuum which political factions from different regions of the country sought to take advantage of. The ensuing Civil War saw brutal violence on ethnic lines, directed by regional elites who bankrolled militias for their own self-interest. This was not just the result of a political vacuum, as many analysts have pointed to, but also an economic vacuum; in which the collapse of a formal economy led to a culture of patron-based violence and disorder. During this period of modernisation in Central Asia, the failure to provide an effective safety net for ordinary people was another factor in building tensions in Central Asian society. In the case of Tajikistan, it was the failure to protect ordinary people from destitute poverty and unemployment which led people to violence.
The economy of the Tajik republic was rapidly modernised under the Soviet project. Agriculture was built up to supply cotton to other parts of the Soviet Union, and industry was developed to support agriculture by processing cotton and producing textiles. The Soviet Union also invested in Tajikistan’s rivers to produce hydroelectricity. Massive central funding of the state economy meant that by the 1970s, there was full employment. Even if the standards of living weren’t particularly high, the state-run economy provided a safety net for people to prevent them from falling into unemployment, poverty and suffering. This changed in the 1980s under Gorbachev’s ‘Perestroika’ – a series of liberalising economic reforms designed to tackle stagnation in more developed parts of the Soviet Union. Under these reforms, underdeveloped parts of the Soviet Union like the Tajik Republic took a big hit. State subsidies stopped, and local businesses were allowed to export raw materials with a very low tax burden so that they could make a profit. All of this meant that the Tajik Republic began to bleed funds, and the safety net that had been provided by huge state intervention in the economy broke down. Unemployment rose to nearly 30%, with a predominantly young population not having the skills to fend for themselves in a system where support wasn’t guaranteed.
In this new free-for-all environment, where thousands and thousands of young people were left without purpose and little to occupy their time with, new opportunities arose. Mafia-style organisations began to form. Major criminal networks were built up, and the young people who had been left unemployed were recruited to run day-to-day operations. Criminal networks were built around the appropriation of state resources and flourishing markets for drugs and weapons, with corrupt political officials facilitating illegal dealings for their own gain. The Soviet invasion and rise of insurgency in Afghanistan also brought a surge in illicit trade across the border. To strengthen their status and protect against rivals, these organisations established militias, posing a significant challenge to the authority of the state. Those in control of these criminal networks became wealthy and powerful regional elites, and their power began to undermine that of the state.
Being able to act as patrons for unemployed men who were desperate for an income to live on, these regional elites had the means to raise armies and challenge for control of the state post-independence. The collapse of the Communist government after independence gave them the opportunity, and expansion of their criminal enterprises provided them with a motive for taking control. Crime lords turned into warlords as conflict became inevitable – rival groups vied for more power to expand their businesses, and in turn the elites needed to expand their criminal activities to pay their mercenaries, leading to a vicious cycle of crime and war. It is therefore clear that the causes of the Tajikistan civil war cannot be understood without understanding the economic shock of the 1980s, and the way in which it made crime and disorder the norm.
Not only did the political chaos create the opportunity for shady elites to make illicit fortunes, but it provided purpose and belonging to a generation of young people who had been failed by the state. For much of the 20th century, Tajikistan had been modernised into a large, industrial state by a system which took on social responsibility for all of its citizens. Even if living standards weren’t great for everyone, the Soviet system sought to eradicate homelessness and suffering and provide everyone with employment. This provided stability during a period of unsettling transformation as local, agrarian patterns of living were ripped up to turn Tajikistan into a Soviet powerhouse, but meant that people were incredibly reliant on the unsustainable program of state subsidies. Once this system collapsed due to the political and economic pressures that prompted Gorbachev’s reforms, backwater parts of the USSR such as Tajikistan were left to fend for themselves. For a young generation that had been promised economic security in a growing economy, the reality that confronted them prompted a great deal of disillusionment. Coupled with this, the lack of opportunities pushed people into the underground economy, as it offered them a stable income, and they were radicalised into fighting for different groups for religious and ethnic reasons, with a rise in Islamist extremism spilling over the border with Afghanistan.
The case of Tajikistan shows another dimension to the breakdown of peace and stability in Central Asian society. Class inequality and a move into a globalised economy laid the foundations for societal conflict in Central Asia as it has done in Kazakhstan, but in Tajikistan, more explosive effects resulted from a failure to maintain a social safety net for the people. In Kazakhstan, the exposure of class and national tensions have threatened the status quo, but the example of Tajikistan showed how economic collapse could lead to even more severe social problems, and when this economic collapse met political instability, it led to brutal violence. In conclusion, the Tajik civil war was a result of modernity and the failure of economic liberalisation to provide for the needs of the population. Tajikistan’s transformation over a century took it from a self-sustaining system of tribal communities, to a free-for-all system of corruption and profiteering which was rigged against the common man. This created a fundamental shift in social relations which saw people channel the intense frustration and desperation they felt into a campaign against the very idea of civil society, engulfing Tajikistan in chaos and violence for five long years.
Fergana Valley Case Study
When it comes to understanding the complete transformation of Central Asian society in the 20th century, and the social norms that it has uprooted, the Tajik Civil War provides a clear account of how the collapse of any structure can lead into anarchy. It is also important to understand, however, what happened in places where people’s lives were overturned by the period of intense change experienced in the 20th century, but where the state maintained a tight grip on power. To this end, the Fergana Valley is an ideal example of how the pressures of unrelenting change pushed against a state that stubbornly refused to reform.
The Fergana Valley is in many ways the heart of Central Asia. A fertile area of low land created by two major rivers running across it, the Fergana Valley has long been a congregating point for communities to settle, taking advantage of favourable agricultural conditions. The Fergana Valley flourished during the golden age of the Silk Road, becoming a major producer of cotton, fruit and silk, and a major trading hub. It also became a centre of Islamic thought in the middle ages. Now, it is the most densely populated area in the region, with a number of major cities and towns, but its days as a metropolis built on prosperity and enlightenment are long gone.
Spanning across the states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Fergana Valley today is blighted by overpopulation, with many not receiving the adequate support needed to maintain their livelihood. Once again, the population had become dependent on a Soviet system of subsidies, particularly farmers who were given a guaranteed wage so long as they met certain targets. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union pulled the rug out from under, and people were left to find their own ways of making a living. Once again, an informal economy took over, providing people with economic opportunities when a guaranteed livelihood was lost. Unlike Tajikistan, however, a chaotic collapse of order was prevented by the continuation of authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, whose boundaries cover most of the region.
In this dynamic, where acute social discontent met a repressive political administration, a conflict as seen in Tajikistan was not possible, but instead the friction created by these two factors led to different extremes which fundamentally altered Uzbek society. After independence, Islam Karimov held a tight grip on power after becoming First Secretary of the Uzbek Soviet Republic two years before its dissolution, and continued as ruler of Uzbekistan until his death in 2016. Karimov faced a serious challenge from rising Islamic extremism during his rule, mainly coming from the Fergana Valley. Islamic extremism started spilling across borders thanks to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in which resistance to the Soviet invasion came to be seen as a holy war; and radicalised those who would later go on to form the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Veterans from this war travelled home and started preaching about the need for continued holy war to implement fundamentalist Islamic ideals, and their ideas caught on particularly in the Fergana Valley.
Some historians argue that economic problems were not a major factor in the rise of Islamic extremism in the Fergana Valley, as the region was not on average any poorer than other Uzbek regions. The overall numbers, however, don’t reflect the large underground economy and rise in youth unemployment which had become especially pronounced in the region due to its overpopulation. Here, a generation of young unemployed men again suffered from a lack of opportunities needed for a stable income, and lacked a sense of belonging in a society which had abandoned their needs, making them the perfect audience for the preachers of an Islamic revolution.
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the city of Namangan in the Fergana Valley fell under de facto control of a group of local Islamic radicals. Led by a preacher and a veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war, the group brutally enforced Sharia Law in the city and sought to build up its political power until they were eventually crushed by Karimov a year later. Once Karimov had consolidated his authority over the whole country, ending any chance of Tajik-style power struggle, the Islamist movement was forced underground. In 1998, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was formed, which began terrorising the Fergana region with raids and kidnappings, most notably leading to the kidnapping of the Mayor of Osh, a major Kyrgyz city in the Fergana Valley. The IMU became a hated enemy of Karimov, who blamed the group for a series of bombings targeted against him in the capital Tashkent.
Karimov would go on to use the spectre of Islamic extremism and the threat of the IMU as cover to crack down on political opposition, legitimising his unquestionable authority. This blurring of the lines between genuine political opposition and extremism created tension in the region, as it made people feel as though they were being unfairly targeted in an already authoritarian state. This tension came to a head in a bloody and tragic episode. In the city of Anijan in May 2005, 23 local businessmen were arrested on charges of extremism. The arrests were met with a great deal of suspicion as Karimov had ulterior motives for making these arrests. The businessmen were becoming increasingly powerful in the local area; and were seen as part of a challenge to Karimov’s authority led by the former governor of the Andijan region Kobiljon Obidov, who had been removed and replaced with a Karimov loyalist. After years of frustration, the people of Andijan decided to take matters into their own hands. After weeks of protests, a group of armed men conducted an open revolt, breaking into the prison and freeing the businessmen before occupying the regional administration building and taking government officials hostage, demanding the resignation of Karimov. This act of rebellion inspired others to come out and protest in the town centre, as Karimov’s government became embroiled in a crisis. Karimov responded by claiming that negotiations had failed and ordered a crackdown on the unrest. Police opened fire, killing hundreds.
The rise of Islamic extremism in the Fergana Valley and the massacre at Andijan tells the story of the extremes that can form when major societal changes happen at a rapid pace with inadequate support for those living through them. In Central Asia, people lost their long-established local patterns of living, which had insulated them from the state, and instead became dependent on the state for their livelihood. When the state was no longer able to provide for its citizens, radical alternatives were proposed, which not only offered people a way of fighting against their economic oppressors, but their political oppressors as well.
The story of the Fergana Valley not only sheds light on how these radical ideas spread in places where desperation and disillusionment were high, but also tells of how ordinary people fought for more control over their lives when they found themselves dismissed by the state. Whilst the story of Islamic extremism tells the story of a few thousand radicals willing to pick up arms, the story of the ordinary masses, some of whom were labelled as terrorists for their dissent, lies in the battle between local and national authority. The Andjan massacre happened against the backdrop of local politicians becoming increasingly powerful in the politics of the Fergana Valley, people who were more popular amongst the local populace because they understood the needs of their communities better. In a sense, the battle for people to establish more local control was an attempt to turn the clocks back to a time when local communities were self-serving and self-sufficient, protected from the overreach of tyranny whilst simultaneously coexisting with unelected rulers.
Conclusion
The history of Central Asia can be regarded as highly unique because of its resistance to modernisation compared to the rest of the Eurasian world. Whilst the world was radically transformed by industrial advancement, urbanisation and class division, Central Asia, known as the ‘backwater’ of an empire which itself was behind the Western world, was for long a land where tradition prevailed, and pastoral farming, self-sustaining agriculture and merchant trading remained the norm. Western historians had for a long time speculated about a democratic uprising against imperial rule in Central Asia, but concepts of democracy and revolution can not be applied in a place where the conditions did not accommodate them. The absence of any cohesive labouring class meant that mass movements typical of other political societies were not present throughout Central Asian history, creating the perception that the people of Central Asia lacked a political consciousness. Central Asia’s lack of economic development, however, did not mean that people lacked the ability to fight for their own political interests. In fact, Central Asians evolved to thrive in a difficult environment, adapting under the yolk of different dynasties and empires and even beginning to influence them in turn.
When revolution finally came to Central Asia, it was a revolution from above by the Soviet state; proclaimed to be for the people, which dragged the so-called ‘backwater’ of the Soviet empire into the twentieth century without compromise. The local agrarian ways of life were torn up and rearranged into massive collective farms, building industries out of resources found in the region. New natural resources such as oil and manganese were exploited for economic potential, and the powerful rivers were harnessed for hydroelectric power. The people of Central Asia were turned from independent farmers and herders into an army of workers; toiling for unyielding economic growth in a state fanatically driven towards victory and prosperity in the vision of Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’. People were forced to endure centuries of progress in just a handful of decades, and the strains it placed on society had a profound effect. This caused major challenges when the universal Soviet system of economic planning and state management fell apart, and people were left to navigate a completely unfamiliar environment completely on their own.
Given the absence of truly democratic institutions, and the continued rule of unaccountable dictators who have taken on almost satirical rituals and characteristics, most still look upon Central Asia as a backward land of mysticism, where simple nomads live in the shadow of narcissistic dictators. In reality, however, Central Asia is becoming affected by new power dynamics. Central Asian leaders may not be subject to elections, scrutiny from democratically elected parliaments, or limited by separation of powers, but they are held to account by their populations through different means. Central Asians have sought to fight interests in their own ways, using methods of popular protest and violent insubordination to put the state under pressure and submit to their demands. The interests of Central Asians centre around their historical affinity towards local autonomy and the tight relationship between religion and society, so it is not a surprise that Western ideas of democracy and human rights are yet to permeate political society in this part of the world.
In short, this paper makes a historical argument that societal evolution is precipitated by economic development, and that Central Asia has only recently evolved like other political societies as it has become exposed to different economic conditions. Due to this, Central Asian society has moved away from a political model of ‘coexistence’, that saw it navigate the long era of empires and towards a model of ‘conflict’, as newly independent states have struggled to settle their political identity in a post-imperial world. More in-depth study of life in Central Asia needs to be done as the region becomes more politically active and unpredictable, with social relations becoming more and more strained. The Central Asia of the future promises to be even more vibrant and challenging in its political relations, and will change the history of the region forever.
Cover Photo Credit: Galen Crout
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