Georgia’s Pivotal Elections are a Key Test for EU Foreign Policy

Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has for decades been considered one of the next states to turn towards Europe – its break from relations with Russia with the 2008 war and its desire to join the EU and NATO making it a bastion of hope for a liberal, European future. This romanticism has been coloured with frequent protests in the capital Tbilisi, with EU flags being flown proudly by aspiring young Georgians, who observers in the West have seen as leading their country to its inevitable European future. Yet Georgia, if it were to gain EU and NATO membership, would be only the fourth state of the former Soviet Union to do so, and its long political legacy as a post-Soviet state complicates its ascension to the Western community. 

Now, the illusion of a European dawn has been broken by the sitting government’s recent manoeuvres to turn Georgia to the reactionary politics of Europe’s adversary Russia, and tighten the ruling party’s grip on power. The Foreign Agents bill, which has been for long a point of hostility between Western and Russian circles, has now made its way to Georgia. Its aim – to register foreign-funded non-governmental organisations as agents of foreign influence, is a rejection of the post-Cold War order created by the West, an order where Western countries have sought to promote values of democracy, civil rights and freedom of the press in countries formerly under Soviet rule or influence. This order has come increasingly under the assault of Putin’s reactionary politics, who has accused the West of using non-governmental organisations to undermine the sovereign laws of other countries and spread ‘degenerate’ progressive ideas. 

Georgia’s pivot towards Russia and its allies; at a time when Russia has made itself a reckless and hostile global actor after its invasion of Ukraine, represents a failure of EU foreign policy. No doubt, the move was caused by the ruling party’s ties with pro-Russian businessmen, including billionaire businessman and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is seen as the shadowy figure behind Georgia’s geopolitical shift. Much has been made of these connections amongst Western circles, but an urgent question must be asked of how the government felt it had the political leeway, both domestically and internationally, to make this dramatic u-turn in its foreign policy. 

Unsurprisingly, the government’s new laws were met with huge protests, some of the largest seen in Georgia’s history, with thousands of young pro-EU citizens organising in Tbilisi. This raised hope for many commentators and political observers in the West that Georgia would once again return to its European path. Yet the government has not been knocked off its course, and has retained support of over 30% in the polls, double the amount of the largest opposition party. In this context, the romanticised notion of Georgia’s European dream needs reevaluation. 

Georgia’s ‘dream’ filled a hole left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had caused economic collapse due to the end of Soviet support, with huge levels of unemployment and unofficial employment sweeping the country in the 1990s. Aspiration to join the EU was built on economic needs – seeking to develop new industries and open up its market, with Georgia implementing some of the most liberal free market reforms in the post-Soviet world. Georgian society is divided, however, on how much Georgia should integrate with EU values, and how it should balance its relationship with the EU with its dominating neighbour Russia. Here, a distinct generational divide exists. Younger, mainly urban Georgians have led the pro-EU movement, yearning a decisive break from Russia and an embrace of European society, whilst the elder generations have lagged behind, holding onto staunchly conservative and deeply religious values, and pondering a future for Georgia in which maintains good relations with both Russia and the EU. The older generations are where the governing Georgian Dream party derives its support from, which seeks to activate its base with moves such as a law which would limit the rights of LGBT groups, arguing for the need to preserve traditional family values. 

Such divisive issues have raised the stakes in Georgia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, but the battlelines drawn have now been completely blown when the government announced its intention to ban all pro-EU opposition parties if it wins a majority. It has alleged, without any evidence, that pro-EU parties are planning to open a new front against Russia to take advantage of the war in Ukraine. The government  claims, almost with conceit, that this would not impact Georgia’s EU candidacy, but this is an extraordinary move which gives up hope of any goodwill with the West, and only invites a ferocious attempt by the opposition to defeat them. 

As it mulls over its response, proposals amongst the EU member states have encouraged a turn towards an aggressive approach: cutting off economic aid, ending visa-free movement, and openly backing the opposition in the elections, pressuring Georgia to change its course back to a democratic path. The EU and its partners have already embarked on a front-footed response, swiftly cutting off €30 million in military aid from the EU’s resilience fund, and $95 million in aid from the United States’ development fund. This reflects an underlying confidence in the West’s political influence, and an optimistic belief encouraged by young pro-EU protesters that Georgia’s destiny can be restored after this ‘blip’. Yet the Georgian government’s actions can only be understood in the context of the wider geopolitical climate, raising the question once again – why does the Georgian government think it can succeed? 

It is yet to be seen if the government’s threat to break up Georgia’s democracy is a move of authority or of desperation. What is known so far is that the Georgian government has looked likely to weather a drop in support, with recent polling showing their vote share in the mid-30s, much higher than any party in the splintered pro-EU opposition. The failure of the pro-EU movement to work together led to a number of competing parties emerging, but recent events have provided an urgent impetus for cooperation, with opposition parties forming into blocs to strengthen their voice in parliament and unite support. In this context, the pledge to ban opposition parties sets out Georgian Dream’s strategy for winning the election, as such constitutional changes would require a majority, whilst a mere plurality in parliament would leave them powerless in favour of the larger pro-EU bloc.

This is a big gamble, but one based on a global trend of conspiracy and misinformation being spread via social media and agenda-based media outlets. Agendas are often focused on exposing deep-seated establishment plots and enemies within the state, seeking to activate people’s anxieties and suspicions during a period of global volatility and uncertainty. In this context, it is not a surprise that the government has focused its conspiracy on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the effect this could have on Georgian-Russian relations. In Georgia, such conspiracies had already been spread for years by media outlets and politicians. In 2022 a breakaway group of MPs from the governing party formed a more hardline party which spread allegations of U.S. political interference in government business and a Western plot to use Georgia as a new military front against Russia. The group, which caused the government to lose its parliamentary majority, started the radical tone employed by the government today, teaming up with media outlets to push their conspiracies, and introducing the bill on foreign agents into parliament. 

Fear and conspiracy, however, is only one arm of the reactionary movement engulfing European foreign policy. The Foreign Agents law has long been used as the legislative arm of Russia’s campaign against the post-Cold War order, which Putin has attacked for imposing Western political values through the creation of civil rights and democracy-based NGOs and the engineering of so-called ‘Colour Revolutions’. Legislation restricting the work of NGOs had been passed in Russia back in 2012, but the law has spread rapidly across the post-Soviet world in recent years. States such as Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan have also adopted the law, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have implemented similar measures. Now, the rot of post-Soviet Western influence is spreading closer to home, with EU nations Hungary and Slovakia pushing forward the laws. The trend is undoubted. Western promotion of civil rights and democratic values is increasingly being seen as undermining national sovereignty, even patronising and overbearing in its application after an era of military interventions and supposed political interference. Now, the influence of the EU and its partners is on the retreat.

This brings the story back to Georgia, and elections which could decide the country’s future. As a result of Georgia’s enthusiasm towards EU membership, the EU had bestowed Georgia as a future partner in its sphere. Winning Georgia, the birthplace of Stalin and an important state in the Soviet Union, would be a big symbolic victory for Europeanism over Russia’s authoritarian interests. The EU has become Georgia’s biggest donor, providing billions in grants to build a new economy and society. The US has also contributed financial support through its USAID Development Agency. 

A great number of people in Georgia have built their trade off the back of EU funding. Key industries in Georgia, such as winemaking and agriculture have become dependent on external funding. Schemes to support women and minorities, develop more environmentally-friendly industries, and to strengthen the economy in impoverished rural parts of the country have also been built with this support. In agriculture, EU support has created over 1,500 farmer cooperatives. Agriculture makes only a small contribution to Georgia’s GDP, yet it employs the largest number of people out of any economic sector. With EU support, this burdensome sector has seen a 20% increase in wages, and the opening of 59 consultation centres has helped farmers become more efficient. Furthermore, EU support has led to the opening of 44 community centres in rural areas, which has helped to provide internet access, banking and public services to communities long left behind. 

It is clear that many Georgians have not only become reliant on EU support, but EU support through the Georgian government. The breakdown in the relationship between these two institutions signals an end to a period of democratisation, where the EU optimistically provided investment to countries such as Georgia with the expectation that liberalising political reform would be implemented in a quid pro quo relationship. The emerging response to the trend of ‘democratic backsliding’ has been to cut off support to government organisations, instead seeking to promote EU values by funding opposition movements and civil society. Such a move offers a way for the EU to decouple its support from increasingly authoritarian governments, but could become problematic as it only leans into populist narratives foreign interference and political blackmail, convincing those voters that are most reliant on EU funding that the West is the enemy of their interests. 

The reality of the situation in states such as Georgia, which are experiencing a turn towards authoritarian government, is much more complex than a simple dividing line between good and evil. EU membership still remains a broadly popular aspiration in Georgian society, but the issue of identity has complicated present-day relations. Divisive social issues have been exploited by Russia as part of wider geopolitical hostilities between the two superpowers, creating division between conservative elements of Georgian society and the EU’s ‘progressive’ identity. Relations have also been strained by the geopolitical climate itself, with Georgians considering the importance of balancing EU aspirations with good relations with Russia.

Such matters have complicated questions of how and when EU accession could happen, throwing into doubt the inevitability of the EU’s liberalising expansion policy. A ‘second wave’ of EU expansion, kick-started in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, now faces its toughest challenge to date at the ballot box in Georgia, and the results of the elections will be a key indicator of the progress being made and the level of popular support for the EU in the periphery states. The answers may not be what those democratic optimists in the EU want to find.

Sources Cited:

Financial Times, EU countries push for sanctions on Georgia over ‘Russian law’ (2024) https://www.ft.com/content/d4475d59-df96-4005-9786-04042704d07e [accessed 2nd September 2024]

OC Media, Pro-government Georgian TV channel merges with anti-West group People’s Power (2022) https://oc-media.org/pro-government-georgian-tv-channel-merges-with-anti-west-group-popular-force/ [accessed 2nd September 2024]

Politico, ‘It feels like there’s no future’: Georgia’s clash with West leaves ordinary people on brink (2024) https://www.politico.eu/article/georgia-clashes-west-people-sanctions-business-eu-farmers-protests-new-law-parliament/ [accessed 2nd September 2024]

 EAPSummit, Facts and Figures about EU-Georgia Relations,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31659/eap-summit-factsheet-georgia-eng.pdf

Photo Credit: Sheldon Kennedy


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